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Abstract   
This paper models the firm as a community à la Akerlof (1980) to account for 
asymmetric behavior, and in particular, downward rigidity of wages.  It is shown that, 
through social interaction among workers in the firm community, wage cuts can give rise 
to a large, discontinuous fall in labor productivity (known as “catastrophe”).   
Furthermore, this large fall in labor productivity will persist or display inertia (known as 
“hysteresis”) even if the wages are restored to the pre-cut level and beyond.  Our 
catastrophe/hysteresis finding with respect to wage cuts can rationalize the downward 
rigidity of wage behavior, and is consistent with the interview evidence of fragile worker 
morale emphasized by Bewley (1999) and others in explaining why employers are 
sensitive to and refrain from cutting worker pay.   
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1.  Introduction 
Why do wages exhibit downward rigidity?  Searching for answers to this question 
can be stretched back at least as far as Keynes’s General Theory.  Although many 
explanations have been proposed, the state of knowledge seems to remain unsatisfactory.
1   
In a highly praised book, Bewley (1999) made a recent attempt to answer the 
puzzling question of why wages do not fall during a recession.
2    He conducted a massive 
number of interviews with more than 300 business people and labor leaders in the 
northeast of the United States during the early 1990s.  After careful assessment in the 
light of his interview evidence, Bewley concluded that the most important factor 
inhibiting wage cuts was the psychological factor of morale, which has nothing to do with 
any conventional economic theory.  This morale story of wage rigidity emphasizes that 
employers are sensitive to and refrain from cutting worker pay on the basis of the belief 
that doing so would hurt worker morale, and consequently, labor productivity.
3  
According to Bewley (1999, p. 54): “In the mind of business leaders, morale has to do 
with workers’ mood and with the willingness to cooperate with company objectives.”  
Workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of their employers if they want to.   
Good morale will motivate workers to perform well even without coercion and financial 
incentives.  However, morale is fragile and may deteriorate easily.  Cutting wages 
could be an important input that triggers the evaporation of worker morale. 
After suggesting a morale theory of wage rigidity, Bewley (1999, p. 436) concluded 
at the end of his book: 
                                                 
1
 See Bewley (1999, chapter 20) for a critical review of the existing theories on wage rigidity.  Recent 
panel-data studies suggest that wages are not completely rigid downward.  See Akerlof et al. (1996), 
Kramarz (2001), and Howitt (2002) for assessments of this strand of the literature.           
2
  For a summary of the book, see Bewley (1998).    Howitt (2002) provided a review of Bewley’s book. 
3
  Other interview studies with owners and managers of firms, including Kaufman (1984), Blinder and Choi 
(1990), Agell and Lundborg (1995), and Campbell and Kamlani (1997), all have a similar finding: pay cuts 
will adversely affect labor effort and productivity.         2
“Companies do use financial incentives and try to maximize profits, and workers want as 
much money as possible.  Workers do cheat, and discipline is vital to organizational 
effectiveness.  What is missing is an appropriate theory of the firm as a community, 
because more than financial incentives and discipline are needed to make companies 
function well.”   
We believe this concluding passage embodies Bewley’s deep reflection on the 
received theories of the firm in the light of his own interview findings.    In this paper we 
respond to Bewley’s call by modeling the firm as a community (in addition to those 
features associated with financial incentives and discipline).  Via such a model, we 
attempt to account formally for the downward rigidity of wages.     
If labor productivity were continuous in wage payment, then small changes in the 
wage would always produce small changes in productivity.   In such a world, employers 
could formulate their wage policy through trial-and-error, since continuous wage 
adjustments always lead to continuous variations in labor productivity.  This 
“continuous” world, which is the maintained assumption in the existing literature, can 
hardly match the phenomenon that employers are sensitive to and refrain from cutting 
worker pay as documented by Bewley and many others.    By contrast, labor productivity 
is not continuous with respect to the wage payment in our firm-as-a-community model.  
This discontinuous world, as we shall show, fits Bewley’s fragile morale story well and 
can explain why wages are rigid downward.  To our knowledge, this is the first paper 
ever to formally demonstrate that adjusting wages may give rise to discontinuity in labor 
productivity.
4 
It is important to recognize that the phenomenon of wage rigidity actually consists of 
two parts: downward rigidity and upward flexibility.    Ideally, a model should be able to 
                                                 
4
  Shafir et al. (1997) have recognized the importance of the discontinuity issue and cited some evidence in 
support of the plausible discontinuity in work effort from wage cuts.  However, they fall short of 
providing a formal model and their focus is not on wage rigidity either.     3
explain not only the downward wage rigidity but also the upward wage flexibility.
5  We 
believe this asymmetric behavior of wages is the most intriguing feature of the whole 
phenomenon.  However, we know only a handful of models in which the asymmetry of 
wages emerges explicitly.
6    Our firm-as-a-community model is capable of accounting for 
asymmetric behavior as well as downward rigidity of wages.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.    Section 2 introduces our model.    We 
analyze the model and explore its implications for wage behavior in Sections 3 and 4.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Model 
Consider a firm in which workers may or may not supply effort e, which takes on 
the value 1 if effort is supplied and 0 otherwise.    If workers do not shirk or shirk but do 
not get caught, they receive the real wage w, which is set by employers.  If workers 
shirk and get caught, they receive a lower wage, which is normalized to zero without loss 
of generality.  Workers, whose only source of income comes from employment, are 
assumed to maximize a utility function: 
  R e m U λ − − + = ) 1 ( ,                                          ( 1 )     
where m is real wage income,  R −  denotes reputation loss in the firm community, and 
                                                 
5
 For evidence on the asymmetric behavior of wages, see Holzer and Montgomery (1993), Campbell and 
Kamlani (1997), Bewley (1999, chapters 10-12), and the references cited in Howitt (2002). 
6
 Exceptions include: Holmstrom (1983) who developed a two-period implicit contract model in which 
wages are rigid downward because workers are insured against downside fluctuations, but wages have to be 
flexible upward to retain workers who may quit; and Lindbeck and Snower (1988) who considered an 
insider-outsider model in which wages will remain unchanged as demand falls but will increase as demand 
rises.  These exceptions are interesting.  However, it seems difficult for them to explain why employers 
are sensitive to cutting worker pay and why downward wage rigidity has to do with worker morale.       4
λ  represents a subjective sensitivity indicator with respect to such loss of reputation.  
The setting of the utility function above indicates that individuals care not only about 
their income and leisure, but also about their reputation within the firm.  As Akerlof 
(1980, p. 753) put it colorfully: ‘persons want to be “rich and famous”.’ 
Workers are heterogeneous in the sense that  λ  is idiosyncratic and varies across 
individuals.    For convenience, we let  λ   be uniformly distributed with support on [0, 1].   
Given  R − , the higher the value of  λ , the higher will be the reputation loss for a worker.   
It is assumed that, due to some exogenous reasons (asymmetric information, 
non-verifiable problems, etc.), the firm does not pay differential wages on the basis of 
λ .
7    
Our model will reduce to a simple shirking model if  0 ≡ R .  Since  the  R term in (1) 
plays a key role in this paper, we discuss the modeling of the R term in detail.     
Modeling reputation loss 
In a seminal paper, Akerlof (1980) put forth the idea that there exists a code of 
behavior (a social custom or social norm) in the community.    A person who disobeys the 
code will be punished by a non-pecuniary loss of reputation in the community.  
Following this idea, it is assumed that there exists a social norm with regard to people’s 
work performance in the firm.  Elster (1989a, p. 101) mentioned: “the workplace is a 
hotbed for norm-guided action” and “one often finds informal norms among the workers 
that regulate their work effort.”  Fehr and Gachter (2000, p. 168) emphasized: “most 
social relations in neighborhoods, families and workplaces are not governed by explicit 
                                                 
7
 One may think of the workers in our model in terms of a particular rank or class in the firm (a group of 
workers who receive more or less the same wage payment).  Strand (1987) and Albrecht and Vroman 
(1998) extended the celebrated Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) shirking model to include adverse selection as 
well as moral hazard.         5
agreements but by social norms.”  The norm or code here is that workers should not 
shirk.  The prevalence of this work norm seems to be the daily experience of most 
people in modern times.  The focus of this paper is not on why such a norm is 
established in the first place, but rather on its consequences.     
In the presence of the no-shirking norm, we assume the following information 
structure within a firm: employers will not identify a shirking worker unless he or she 
gets caught; however, shirkers are known among their worker colleagues.  This 
particular assumption that agents (workers) are well informed but that the principal 
(employer) is not does not seem unrealistic, and it is actually the starting point of the 
large literature on implementation under complete information.
8  
A worker who shirks evidently represents a violation of the prescribed code of 
behavior and hence may be sanctioned by group disapproval, by peer pressure, and in the 
extreme, by ostracism.  Following Akerlof (1980), we summarize these resulting 
informal social sanctions against the shirker by his or her loss of reputation in the firm.  
To be specific, we have: 
  ) (x R R =   if the worker shirks;  0 = R  o t h e r w i s e ,               
where x denotes the proportion of shirking workers in the firm.    It is assumed: 
Assumption 1.  The function  ) (x R  is twice continuously differentiable with  0 ) ( < ′ x R  
for all x. 
For the no-shirking norm to be social, people in the firm must share and sustain it.  
The dependence of R on x is to capture some social property of the no-shirking norm.  
Under our “complete information” assumption, the extant proportion of shirking workers 
                                                 
8
 See Palfrey (2002) for a survey of the literature.  One may assume that even workers are not well 
informed so that anyone who shirks will not be identified unless he or she gets caught.    This “incomplete 
information” assumption complicates the algebra a little, but our results remain qualitatively the same.             6
in the firm is known among workers.  The assumption  0 ) ( < ′ x R  indicates that the 
higher the proportion of shirkers in the firm, the smaller will be the loss of reputation for 
a shirker as a result of his or her violation of the no-shirking code.    This setup is in line 
with the emphasis in the social norm literature that the bite or effectiveness of social 
norms against their violators will become less intense if the extent of the violation 
becomes more prevalent.   
To facilitate our analysis, we also impose the following assumption: 
Assumption 2.    0 ) ( = ′ ′ x R   for all x, and  0 ) ( → x R  as  1 → x .   
The first part of this assumption approximates the reputation loss function in a 
first-order sense.  This is a simplification.  As to the second part, it seems plausible.  
When nobody obeys the code prescribed by the norm, nobody can legitimately impose 
social sanctions against violators, and as a result, the norm will de facto disappear.  As 
will be seen, the resulting equilibria under Assumption 2 are consistent with the equilibria 
envisioned by Akerlof (1980).   
A simple function that satisfies both Assumptions 1 and 2 is 
  x x R − =1 ) ( . (2) 
For concreteness and simplicity, we will give  ) (x R  this explicit functional form from 
now on.   
Through the no-shirking norm and the reputation loss specification, we essentially 
model the firm as a community and let workers interact socially in the firm community.  
This social interaction will be the key that drives the main results of this paper.   
   7
3.  Preliminary  analysis 
According to our setup in the previous section, the expected utility of a type  λ  
worker who is not shirking is   
  w V
N = , (3) 
while for a shirker, the expected utility is     
  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 x w q V
S − − − + = λ , (4) 
where x x R − =1 ) (  has been imposed and  0 > q  denotes the exogenous probability of 
shirking detection.
9  From (4), we see that a worker who chooses to shirk will face the 
risk of losing wage payment ( 0 = w ) and a sure loss in reputation (the last term).     
From (3)-(4), a type  λ   worker will choose not to shirk if  S N V V ≥ ; that is, 
  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 x w q w − − − + ≥ λ . (5) 
This decision rule prescribes how, given the shirking detection probability q and the wage 
payment  w, a type λ  worker will make a shirking-or-not choice for each possible 
proportion of shirking workers x in the firm community.     
Solving from (5) yields the marginal type of workers,  λ ˆ, who are merely indifferent 
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 Since our parsimonious model is not designed to address the monitoring issue, the probability q is 
assumed to be at the margin of its effectiveness and fixed throughout this paper.  For a discussion on the 
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λ . (6c) 
Workers with  λ λ ˆ ≤  will shirk, while those with  λ λ ˆ >  will not shirk.  In (6), it is 
implicitly assumed that  qw > 1 ; otherwise, no workers will ever shirk.         
The outcome  0 ˆ < w λ  is standard in the shirking literature.  It indicates that the 
higher the wage, the smaller will be the number of shirkers.  The outcome  0 ˆ > x λ  
captures the “snowballing” effect: the higher the extant proportion of shirkers, the larger 
will be the number of workers who will choose to shirk.    When the shirking behavior is 
more prevalent, the no-shirking norm will become less effective against shirkers, and 
consequently, the more intensified shirking will become. 
Since  λ  is uniformly distributed with support on [0, 1], from the definition of  λ ˆ, 
we also have 
  x = λ ˆ . (7) 
Given a proportion of shirkers x, there is a corresponding proportion of workers  λ ˆ who 
will choose to shirk according to (6).  However, the resulting  λ ˆ  may not be consistent 
with the given x.    Equation (7) simply imposes the consistent condition.    It is clear that, 
except for corner solutions, an equilibrium x must satisfy (6) and (7) simultaneously.   
   9
4.    On asymmetric behavior and downward rigidity of wages 
We are ready to explain the asymmetric behavior and downward rigidity of wages. 
Our explanation proceeds with reference to several figures that serve as illustrations.  
We depict the status quo first. 
Status quo 
Consider Fig. 1.  The locus  ) ( 0 w w XX =  stands for the functional relationship 
between  λ ˆ and  x as expressed in (6) when the status quo wage equals 
0 w .  Due  to  (6b) 
and (6c), the slope of  XX  is positive and increasing.  Note that  ∞ → λ ˆ  as  1 → x .  
This property is due to Assumption 2. 
In Fig. 1, the locus  YY  traces the relationship between  λ ˆ and x as expressed in 
(7).    It is obvious that the slope of  YY  equals  1. 
(Insert Fig. 1 about here) 
Given any x, the actual proportion of shirking workers will be increasing if  x > λ ˆ , 
but it will be decreasing if  x < λ ˆ .    The reasoning behind this result is intuitive.    When 
x > λ ˆ , the proportion of workers who would like to shirk is higher than the extant 
proportion of shirkers.   As a result, the actual proportion of shirking workers will be 
increasing.  When  x < λ ˆ , the opposite occurs.  The arrows in Fig. 1 summarize the 
movement of x.
10 
There are three equilibria in Fig. 1, i.e. the points 
0 x , 
1 x  and 
2 x .  However, as 
the arrows indicate, only 
0 x  and 
2 x  are stable equilibria.  These two equilibria 
correspond to two different levels of the no-shirking norm.    Note that while the level of 
shirking is mild at 
0 x , all workers shirk at 
2 x  as the norm unravels.  This result is 
                                                 
10
  A simple dynamics for the movement shown in Fig. 1 is:  ) ˆ ( x x − = λ κ & , where  κ   is a positive scalar.   10
consistent with that envisioned by Akerlof himself (1980, p. 751): 
“[T]here are two equilibria.  In one of these equilibria the custom is obeyed, and the 
values underlying the custom are widely subscribed to by members of the community.    In 
the other equilibrium the custom has disappeared, no one believes in the values 
underlying it, and it is not obeyed.”           
Although there are two possible stable equilibria, we focus on the more interesting 
case where there is a low shirking equilibrium in the firm community initially.  To 
explain the fragile worker morale with respect to wage cuts, it seems natural to start from 
a low shirking equilibrium at the status quo.   
Adjusting wages 
Now let us consider what will happen if employers adjust the wage payment.  
According to (6a), the status quo locus  ) ( 0 w w XX =  will shift downward if employers 
raise the wage but it will shift upward if employers cut the wage.  Since the status quo 
equilibrium is at point 
0 x , it is not difficult to see from Fig. 1 that raising wages 
continuously will shift the locus  XX  downward continuously, resulting in a continuous 
decrease in the equilibrium proportion of shirking workers.  The result for wage cuts 
will be very different, as we discuss below. 
As we have noted, cutting wages will shift the locus  XX  upward.  Consider the 
locus  ) ( 0 w w w XX < =  in Fig. 2.  The unique feature of this locus is that it is 
tangential to the locus YY  at the point  y .  When the wage payment is adjusted 
downward from 
0 w  on, cutting wages continuously will shift the locus  XX  upward 
continuously, resulting in a continuous increase in the equilibrium proportion of shirking 
workers.  However, this continuous change in equilibrium will not last when the wage   11
cut reaches w.  At  w w = , except for  x = λ ˆ  at point  y ,  x > λ ˆ  for all x for the 
locus  ) ( 0 w w w XX < = .  That  is,  at  w w = , the proportion of workers who will choose 
to shirk (i.e.  λ ˆ) is always higher than the corresponding proportion of shirkers (i.e. x).  
This triggers a bandwagon effect to increase the actual proportion of shirkers from point 
y .    The increase will not stop until the actual proportion of shirkers has reached 
2 x , i.e. 
all workers shirk at the new equilibrium. 
(Insert Fig. 2 about here) 
The wage,  w, associated with the locus  ) ( 0 w w w XX < =  in Fig. 2 represents a 
threshold wage level.    As soon as the wage cut reaches  w, there will be a “catastrophe” 
or a discontinuous jump in equilibrium from  y  to 
2 x , generating a disastrous rise in the 
equilibrium proportion of shirkers as a result of a tiny cut in wages.
11     
As wage cuts reach the threshold level, the “size” of the group of shirkers will 
furnish a critical-mass effect so that the enforcement of the no-shirking norm dramatically 
loses its bite.  The result is that non-shirkers will move en masse to become shirkers.  
This is the reason for a sudden, disastrous fall in productivity at the wage  w.  Water 
will freeze or melt as a gradual change in temperature reaches some critical level.  An 
analogous event occurs in the human world of our model. 
The above disastrous rise in shirking is an irreversible result or a “hysteresis” in the 
following sense.  Suppose that employers find the disastrous rise in shirking as a result 
of their wage cut and try to avoid this terrible result by restoring the wage to the pre-cut 
level.  What will happen?  Using Fig. 3, the restoration of the wage will shift 
downward the  XX  locus from  ) ( w w XX <  back to  ) ( 0 w w XX = .  However, the 
                                                 
11
 Catastrophe theory is a mathematical theory that studies how a continuous variation in parameters can 
cause discontinuous effects in the large.    The discontinuous effects or jumps are known as “catastrophes.”   
For an introduction to catastrophe theory and its applications in economics, see Rosser (2000).               12
equilibrium proportion of shirking workers will not return to the pre-cut equilibrium 
0 x .  
Instead, since the new status quo equilibrium is at 
2 x , it is clear from Fig. 3 that the 
equilibrium after the restoration of the wage will remain at 
2 x .  In other words, all of 
the workers will still choose to shirk in equilibrium even if the wage has been adjusted 
back to the pre-cut level 
0 w .    
(Insert Fig. 3 about here) 
Within our model setup, we see that  ∞ → λ ˆ  as  1 → x .  This implies that the 
equilibrium 
2 x , where all workers shirk, is a “sink” in the sense that the firm will be 
stuck there once it is reached and no wage policy can reverse this disastrous outcome.  
This result may be extreme, but it nevertheless captures the idea that restoring the 
effectiveness of social norms is likely to be prohibitively costly once no one believes in 
the  values  underlying  the  norms.           
The key to our hysteresis lies in there being two stable equilibria, 
0 x  and 
2 x , 
associated with the same locus  ) ( 0 w w XX = .  Which equilibrium will be realized 
depends critically on whether the status quo proportion of shirkers is lower or higher than 
the 
1 x  shown in Fig. 3.  Intuitively speaking, the bite or effectiveness of the social 
norm against shirking hinges on the proportion of shirking workers at the status quo.    If 
shirking is widespread and rampant in the firm community, the no-shirking norm will be 
too weak to generate any real reputation loss that will be inflicted on workers who shirk.   
By contrast, if shirking is mild or moderate, the no-shirking norm will furnish a 
substantial reputation loss that will be inflicted on workers who shirk.  This explains 
why, depending on whether the status quo portion of shirkers is lower or higher than the 
1 x  shown in Fig. 3, the same wage payment 
0 w  can lead to very different proportions 
of shirking workers in equilibrium.   13
Effort/productivity function 
Given the status quo wage  0 w , one can derive the effort/productivity function 











= , (8) 
where 
* x  denotes the (interior) equilibrium proportion of shirking workers.  Since in 
our model a worker’s effort takes on the value 1 if effort is supplied and 0 otherwise, the 
average amount of equilibrium effort supplied by the workers equals 
* 1 x − .  This 
amount of equilibrium effort also represents the average productivity of the firm. 













x . (9) 
It can be shown that the denominator  0 2 1
* > − x  must be true at 
* x  if 
* x  is a stable 
equilibrium.
12    This result enables us to assign a positive sign to (9) as long as  0
* > x .
13  
Thus (9) gives rise to a positive wage-effort relationship, which is the heart of the 
efficiency wage hypothesis.  It can be shown that the sign of 
2 * 2 / ) 1 ( w x ∂ − ∂  is 
negative.       
On the basis of the above analysis, one can draw the effort/productivity function 
corresponding to Fig. 1-3 as shown in Fig. 4.  When the wage is adjusted upward from 
the status quo wage  0 w , the effort/productivity will rise continuously at a decreasing rate.   
By contrast, when the wage is adjusted downward from the status quo wage  0 w , the 
effort/productivity will decline continuously at an increasing rate until  w is reached.  
At the threshold wage  w, it will fall discontinuously all the way to zero and remain there 
even if the wage is restored to the status quo wage  0 w  and  beyond.
14  
                                                 
12
 Using the simple dynamics specified in Footnote 10, the stability requires:  0 ) 1 ˆ ( / < − = ∂ ∂ x x x λ κ & .  
From equation (6), (6b) and (7),  0 ) 1 ˆ ( < − x λ  implies  0 2 1 > −
∗ x . 
13
  The equilibrium effort may be unresponsive to a wage raise at  0 = x .   
14
 (8) is a quadratic equation in 
∗ x  and hence has two distinct roots in general.  It will give rise to the   14
(Insert Fig. 4 about here) 
It is interesting to observe from Fig. 4 that the equilibrium effort/productivity is 
either at high levels (represented by the curve  1 y ) or at low levels (the zero equilibrium 
effort/productivity), and there is no middle ground.    This no-middle-ground result can be 
seen directly from Fig. 1 to Fig. 3: except for  1 = x , any proportion of shirkers that is 
located at point y and beyond will never be realized as a stable equilibrium.  These 
unstable equilibria are represented by the dotted line in Fig. 4.  For example, at the 
status quo wage 
0 w , there are three equilibrium proportions of shirking workers, 
0 x , 
1 x  and 
2 x  (see Fig. 1).  These three equilibria correspond to the three equilibria in 
relation to effort/productivity shown in Fig. 4, that is, 
0 1 x − , 
1 1 x −  and 
2 1 x − .   
To sum up our finding, we state: 
Result 1.  The positive wage-effort relationship holds in our firm community.    However, 
work effort in response to wage adjustments behaves asymmetrically.  Starting from a 
low-shirking equilibrium, while average effort is continuous in wage raises, it is not 
continuous in wage cuts -- a continuous cut in wages can give rise to a large, 
discontinuous fall in effort, and furthermore, this large fall in effort will persist even if the 
wages are restored to the pre-cut level and beyond.    Because of the large, discontinuous 
fall in average effort and its persistence, the effort function facing employers becomes de 
facto a correspondence with two parts: one is associated with high efforts while the other 
is associated with low efforts, and there is no middle ground in between. 
Efficiency wage 
To discern the value added of Result 1 to the extant literature, it is best to compare it 
with the efficiency wage hypothesis, which is a leading candidate explanation as to why 
                                                                                                                                                   
unique root  2 / 1 =
∗ x  when  the  locus  XX is tangential to the locus YY (the point y in Fig. 2).       15
labor markets do not clear in the presence of high involuntary unemployment.
15   
The central tenet of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that workers’ productivity 
increases along with the wage offered, and consequently, there is a benefit as well as a 
cost involved in the payment of higher wages by employers.  The tradeoff between the 
benefit and the cost at the margin leads to a profit-maximizing efficiency wage, and this, 
in turn, explains why employers may find it unprofitable to cut wages even in the 
presence of high unemployment.     
According to this argument, the equilibrium wage may be far above the 
market-clearing wage and so it can explain the persistence of involuntary unemployment.   
However, the equilibrium wage will likely exhibit high flexibility in the presence of 
shocks since it represents the profit-maximization wage.
16   
Let  ) ( 1 ) (
* w x w e − ≡ , that is, the effort function facing employers.  Employers are 
assumed to choose a wage to maximize the following profit function: 
  w q w e q w se w q x x w se ] ) ( 1 [ ) ( )] 1 ( ) 1 [( ) (
* * + − − = − + − − = π  (10) 
where s is an idiosyncratic shift factor denoting shocks in either technology or the relative 
price of the firm’s product (with 
0 s s =  at the status quo).
17  In (10), both non-shirkers 
(i.e.  * 1 x − ) and shirkers who do not get caught (i.e.  ) 1 (
* q x − ) will receive the wage w.   
The first-order condition from maximizing (10) yields: 
  0 ] ) ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( = + − − ′ − =
∂
∂
q w e q w e qw s
w
π . (11) 
                                                 
15
  See Blanchard and Fischer (1989, chapter 9) and Romer (1996, chapter 10). 
16
  It is known that the profit-maximizing efficiency wage derived from the Solow condition is a real wage 
rigidity and independent of any idiosyncratic shock (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, Section 9.4).  This 
result may be too strong to be true, and moreover, it cannot explain the asymmetric behavior of wages. 
17
 Since shocks are idiosyncratic, there is no distinction between real and money wage.  The purpose of 
this setup is to abstract from the question of whether wage rigidity is real or nominal, which is not our focus 
in this paper.  An appendix that explores nominal wage rigidity from the viewpoints of money illusion 
(Shafir et al., 1997) and intentions (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003) is available from the authors upon request.           16
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where we have made use of the sign of (9) and the second-order condition 
0 2 ) ( < ′ − ′ ′ − e q e qw s .  If, as is typically assumed, the effort function were continuous 
without exhibiting catastrophe/hysteresis, the profit-maximization wage would be highly 
flexible according to (12).  Employers would raise wages in the presence of positive 
shocks (
0 s s > ) and cut wages in the presence of negative shocks (
0 s s < ).  Neither 
asymmetric behavior nor downward rigidity of wages would be expected. 
Now consider our derived effort function.  A distinct feature associated with the 
effort function in Fig. 4 is that there is an “edge” wage,  w, beyond which wage cuts will 
give rise to catastrophes in labor productivity.
18    From (11), we obtain:   
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+ = , (13) 
where  s is the critical shock corresponding to the “edge” wage w.  Note that the 
profit-maximization wage  * w  will equal the edge wage w  for all  s s ≤ .  This 
“rigidity” result opens a possible route to explain the downward rigidity of wages.  In 
particular, if  s s ≤ 0  holds, then  w w =
*  for all 
0 s s ≤ , that is, employers will not cut 
wages in the presence of negative shocks and hence wages will be rigid downward.    The 
significance of this result is best understood by comparing it with the standard 
“flexibility” result as exemplified by (12).  There is no possibility for wage rigidity 
according to (12), whereas this possibility exists according to (13).     
Despite being interesting and potentially in the right direction, the above result falls 
short of “establishing” the downward rigidity of wages.  Specifically, the critical 
                                                 
18
  Strictly speaking, the “edge” wage should be  ε − w , where  ε   is a very small, positive number.    For 
ease of exposition, we simply ignore  ε .     17
condition  s s ≤ 0   may or may not hold for a high fraction of firms at the status quo.
19 
Uncertainty 
So far, no uncertainty is involved regarding the “edge” beyond which wage cuts will 
give rise to catastrophes in labor productivity.  However, it seems more realistic to 
assume that employers do not know ex ante the exact location where the “edge” occurs.  
This possibility opens a different route to explain the downward rigidity of wages in our 
m o d e l .                
Suppose from the viewpoint of employers that a distribution rather than a singleton 
characterizes the “edge.”  From this “edge” distribution, employers will subjectively 
face a positive probability of catastrophe occurrence, denoted by  ) ; ( 0 w w θ , if they cut 
worker pay from the status quo wage 
0 w  to w.  The probability θ  is presumably 
increasing in wage cut, that is,  0 / < ∂ ∂ w θ  for 
0 w w ≤ .
20       
                                                 
19  Assuming that  1 0 = s   and using (8)-(9) and (13),  s ≤ 1   if and only if: 
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in which  ) 1 /( ) ( / ) (
* * * ∗ ∗ − = ′ − ≡ x x x R x R x η .  The stability requires that  0 2 1 > −
∗ x  at 
* x , and hence, 
we have  1 0 < <η .    Workers who are caught shirking are dismissed in shirking models; see, for example, 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).  In line with this literature, the term 
* qx  in our model represents the 
proportion of workers who get dismissed.    Available data indicate that the average monthly dismissal rate 
is around 0.3 per 100 employees (Bewley, 1999, p. 130).    Now suppose that all firms are identical, except 
for  η .    Since little is known about  η   empirically, it does not seem unreasonable to assume a priori that 
η  is uniformly distributed over (0, 1).  Then, from (#), the fraction of the firms with  w w =
*  at the 
status quo would equal 8/9 if  10 / 1
* = qx .    This fraction would still reach 3/4 even if the value of 
* qx  is 
as high as 1/5. 
20
 One may not rule out the possibility that  0 / = ∂ ∂ w θ  at  0 w w = .  However, this possibility is a 
measure zero as compared to the set of other possibilities that  0 / < ∂ ∂ w θ  at  0 w w = .  Moreover,   18
Now consider a low-shirking equilibrium with the profit-maximization wage 
0
* w w =  at the status quo (
0 s s = ).  When there is the uncertainty as described above, 
employers will face different profit functions, depending on whether they raise or cut 
wages.  If they raise wages, employers will maximize the profit function  (.) π  defined 
by (10) and follow the comparative statics of wages prescribed by (12).  By contrast, if 
they cut wages, employers will maximize a different profit function: 
  0 ) ; ( )) ; ( 1 ( 0 0 ⋅ + ⋅ − = Π w w w w θ π θ , (14) 
in which  0 = π  if catastrophes occur.
21  This profit function differs from  (.) π  simply 
because cutting wages may give rise to catastrophes in labor productivity.    If there were 
no possibility of catastrophes so that  0 ) ; ( 0 = w w θ , then  π = Π  would  hold.     
The first-order condition from maximizing (14) yields: 











θ . (15) 
Since  0 / < ∂ ∂ w θ  for 
0 w w ≤   by our assumption, the profit-maximization wage 
) (
* * s w  derived from (15) will be higher than the profit-maximization wage  ) (
* s w  
derived from (11) for any 




* * ) ( ) ( w s w s w = > .   
It can be checked that the comparative statics on the basis of (15) leads to 
0 / > ds dw  as well.  This result together with 
0 0
* * ) ( w s w >  implies that there exists 
0 1 s s <  with 
0 1
* * ) ( w s w = .  Since 
0
* * ) ( w s w ≥  for  all  s with 
0 1 s s s ≤ ≤ , we obtain the 
                                                                                                                                                  
suppose that a set of distributions rather than a unique distribution characterizes the “edge.”  Then, as 
implied by the famous Ellsberg (1961) paradox, a decision maker will tend to behave cautiously in the face 
of the imprecise knowledge of the odds.  In terms of our model, this means that employers will tend to 
pick a higher value of  ) ; ( 0 w w θ   in their calculation of catastrophes.   
21
  This assumption will be true in our setup if the firm has the option of closedown.   19
result that employers will cut their worker pay from the status quo wage 
0 w   if and only 
if negative shocks are large enough so as to satisfy 
1 s s < .   
The solid, zigzag line in Fig. 5 depicts the optimal wage policy against shocks when 
starting from a low-shirking equilibrium with 
0 0
* ) ( w s w = .  It is clear from the figure 
that the wage 
0 w  will remain optimal in the presence of negative shocks if and only if 
the extent of the shocks does not exceed 
1 0 s s − .  It is also clear from the figure that 
employers will raise wages in the presence of positive shocks. 
(Insert Fig. 5 about here) 
To sum up our finding, we state: 
Result 2.  Starting from a low-shirking equilibrium and facing uncertainty with regard 
to the exact location of the “edge” where catastrophes occur, employers will raise wages 
in the presence of positive shocks, but they will cut wages in the presence of negative 
shocks if and only if the shocks are sufficiently adverse.   
Caution and hesitation regarding wage cuts vividly show up in Bewley’s (1999, 
chapter 11) massive interviews of employers.  All employers in the interviews thought 
that pay cuts would cause problems and their main argument was that employee reactions 
would cost them more than the pay cuts would save.  Bewley (p. 430) summarized his 
survey findings by writing: “Resistance to pay reduction comes primarily from employers, 
not from workers or their representatives, though it is anticipation of negative employee 
reactions that makes employers oppose pay cutting.”  Our model clearly fits this 
description.    Bewley (pp. 214-5) observed that pay cuts, if they did occur, were brought 
about mainly when firms had financial problems or had trouble competing.  These may   20
well correspond to the situation where shocks are sufficiently adverse.
22 
Finally, we would like to refer to two main testable hypotheses that might 
potentially falsify the theory of our paper.    One is from the viewpoint of workers.    The 
testable hypothesis is that the workers’ effort function is discontinuous rather than 
continuous with respect to wage cuts (see Fig. 4).    The other testable hypothesis is from 
the perspective of employers.  It is that the employers’ wage payment decision exhibits 
asymmetric behavior.    That is, the employers will raise wages in the presence of positive 
shocks, but they will cut wages in the presence of negative shocks only if the shocks are 
sufficiently adverse (see Fig. 5).  Some evidence in support of both hypotheses does 
exist.
23   
 
                                                 
22
  In our model, workers are concerned with their absolute wage payment.   An interesting extension is to 
take into consideration the scenario where workers are concerned with their wage relative to the wages 
received by other people doing similar work in other firms.  However, this extension raises the difficult 
issue of how relative wages are determined, whether the firm would react differently to an economy-wide 
shock than to a firm-specific shock, whether the stigma should depend on relative wages as well as the 
fraction of others that shirk, and so on.    We should admit that our model is not complete in this regard, and 
it would be better to write another paper in which the relative-wage considerations are integrated into the 
analysis from the beginning. 
23
 See footnotes 4 and 5.  From equation (8), we see that: (i) when the wage rises above  q / 1 , the only 
equilibrium is one in which no one shirks, and (ii) a large, discontinuous fall in labor productivity will 
occur if the wage falls below  q 4 / 3  (substituting  2 / 1
* = x  in (8)).  Thus, there should be more wage 
flexibility in high-paying jobs (wage payments that are above  q / 1 ) than low-paying jobs (wage payments 
that are near  q 4 / 3 ).  This is also a testable hypothesis implied by our model.  Note that 
q q q 4 / 1 4 / 3 / 1 = − .  Thus, the lower the  q , the more room there will be for wage cuts without the 
occurrence of a “catastrophe.”    The shirking detection technology (represented by the parameter  q  in  our 
model) may differ across firms, industries, or countries.  Another testable hypothesis implied by our 
model is that a high-shirking detection (a higher  q ) should be associated with less wage flexibility than a 
low-shirking detection (a lower  q ).   21
5.  Conclusion 
“Actions are shaped jointly by norms and self-interest” (Elster, 1989b, p. 151).  
This statement seems compelling.  Akerlof (1980) emphasized that the non-pecuniary 
enforcement of norms may dominate or depress pecuniary self-interest so as to ensure the 
survival of the norms.  In this paper we model the firm as a community, detecting that 
the non-pecuniary enforcement of norms may lose its bite dramatically as the amount of 
pecuniary rewards is reduced.  To prevent the dramatic loss of effectiveness of the bite 
of the norms and the resulting catastrophe/hysteresis in productivity from occurring, 
employers need to maintain pecuniary rewards and hence do not cut their worker pay as 
much as they could.    This explains why wages are rigid downward. 
Our model in this paper is admittedly rudimentary.    We do not claim that the factors 
we omit are irrelevant or unimportant for wage adjustments.  Still, it is hoped that our 
firm-as-a-community model may have contributed to a better understanding of 
asymmetric behavior, and in particular, downward rigidity of wages.   
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Fig. 4. Effort / productivity function 
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